I touched on the concept of ‘civilian soldiers’ a couple weeks ago when I mentioned the possible tiff between Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates over lack of State Department employee support of and participation in Iraqi reconstruction efforts.
Now, another article addresses the need for a new national Peace Corps of sorts, but this time one geared more for serious and large-scale infrastructure building, agricultural production, and the like.
Interestingly, this story paints the State Department in an entirely different light from earlier accounts that suggested a reluctance on the part of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice to contribute support personnel to the reconstruction effort.
Apparently, when Colin Powell was Secretary, he decided to form a 200-person response team under the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. This group would be comprised half of State Department staff and half from other government agencies. After two years, this cadre would evolve into reservists, and another 200-man component would be constituted.
However, as is often the case, the money didn’t follow and fuel the momentum for movement. Inertia ensued. What the State Department projected as required funds ($350 million) for the government team and a 3,000-person state and local government and private sector contingent was pared down 98% to a paltry $7 million.
Enter Congress. Senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and 2008-presidential-hopeful Joseph Biden (D-Del.) introduced a bill to create the Response Readiness Corps with the mission to respond to international crises immediately.
Enter politics. Some Republicans didn’t think the White House truly supported this vehicle, and wouldn’t vote for it. Some Democrats thought that this ‘mop up crew’ would further embolden President Bush and Vice President Cheney to pillage from pillar to post with impunity knowing that other Americans would spring forth to rescue debilitated countries and salvage America’s reputation in the process.
What happened to the vision?
It was there as early as the Fall of 2003 when now-maligned (in some circles) former Iraq Reconstruction Chief, Paul Bremer, cried out for help from Cabinet members to send overseas their Executive Branch employees to help out. Senators Lugar and Biden followed a few months later with their legislative proposal.
This entire episode epitomizes how, in yet another way, this country was inadequately prepared to execute President Bush’s controversial foreign policy doctrine of preemptory action against enemies or threats to our national security.
We’ve learned that our intelligence apparatus wasn’t up to the task of satisfactorily culling out enemies’ identities, intentions, or capabilities. Now, we’re learning that we haven’t properly thought through a vision of how to walk with countries against which we take military action.
This lack of vision – the absence of the truly big picture understanding of war and its aftermath – may ultimately be judged as our single biggest shortcoming in the prosecution of the Iraqi War.
One thing is obvious. History will have much to consider in the coming decades as it analyzes our motivations and effectiveness in Iraq and the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
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Fred W. Apelquist, III, M.Ed.
Approximately 500 words.
© March, 2007