You can accurately assert that our nation has reached critical mass on the War in Iraq.
Now that President Bush has vetoed a bill tying military funding to prescribed withdrawal dates from the theater, we have crossed the Rubicon.
For many months, many in public life have been bewailing the debacle that is Iraq. Affirming that mistakes were made and that strategic and tactical operations were mismanaged is akin to proclaiming that “the universe is a big place, perhaps the biggest” to steal a phrase from Kilgore Trout, a.k.a. Philip Jose’ Farmer.
The obvious has brought with it oblivion. Not only is the war “lost” – polls say we should just leave -- but we are, too. Our hearts and minds are unable to reach national accord on next steps. This is a matter of life and death for our soldiers and Iraqi civilians. Shame on us!
Those wishing to end the suffering for American troops by exiting forthwith are unable to appreciate the very real and dangerous diplomatic consequences that will befall our country for decades to come. [There is your Vietnam War link.] Those desiring to persist and prevail do not have sufficient knowledge or resources – and may never – to understand how to accomplish that.
George Tenet’s book, At the Center of the Storm, was released this week and provides even more fodder for flagellation. What is clearer to me than the Hope Diamond sparkling in the bright noonday sunshine is that no one seems to have a firm grip on conducting an effective campaign to transform Iraq into a reasonably stable, righteous, and civil society.
Equally as clear is our collective dearth of desire to sit down and talk seriously about the essential matter of properly leaving Iraq. What damage will be done by staying or leaving depends upon how and when we leave? What types of forces and resources will stay on and why? How do our plans dovetail with the interests of the Iraqi government, assuming such a polity can realistically be referred to as a government? Can it articulate and act upon a national vision? These are the matters to discuss and evaluate. It is far easier to attack your opponent without owning the burden of developing and advancing a clear roadmap citing costs, benefits, etc.
Perhaps not enough of the higher-ups in our Executive Branch read and embraced the themes expressed in David Fromkin’s 1989 book, A Peace to End All Peace. In the post-9/11 maelstrom, I confess that I failed to recall his portrayal of the Middle East as a region locked in hopeless tribal and other conflicts. Somehow we Americans feel we can change the unchangeable.
We did it in Afghanistan, which gave us a false sense of invincibility. Or did we? A resurgence of insurgency is raising its ugly head.
History shows that no nation has ever conquered Afghanistan – not the British in the 1800’s, not the Soviets (to our enjoyment in the 1980’s), and maybe not the U.S. in the 21st century. So far, we have been more successful than any other nation, but whether our departure was premature poses still another matter for serious and reasoned debate. Regrettably, our leaders seem woefully ill-prepared to do so.
President Bush has not conceptualized this conflict effectively. Facile soundbites exhorting us merely to persist ring hollow without supporting foundational justifications. It has been argued, without successful White House rebuttal, that there appears to be no clear strategy to articulate. Yet, if this administration were more adept as such tasks, the tenor and content of the national debate would be materially different. Today it is shrill. It is destructive. It is without promise.
Years from now people may not regret leaving Iraq and its insurgency (or Civil War: choose your favorite word), but they will deeply regret how we did it.
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Fred W. Apelquist, III, M.Ed.
Approximately 640 words.
© May, 2007